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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1966 amendment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and
the 1968 enactment of the Truth in Lending Act helped to set off a
litigation explosion by bringing thousands of new claims into the
federal courts. Most such claims were asserted under subdivision
(b)(3) of the rule, which is its most controversial part. That subdivi-
sion was intended to achieve economies of time, effort and expense
and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated,
without sacrificing procedural fairness or due process.
It is a condition to the applicability of subdivision (b)(3) that the
court find it superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of a controversy. In Truth in Lending cases the
incentives written into the statute offer some available alternatives to
the class action. Injunctive relief under rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) and the
test case procedure have some judicial support. Prior to the 1974
amendment of the Truth in Lending Act, judicial decisions were ne-
gating (b)(3) class action treatment of Truth in Lending cases because
of defendants' unlimited exposure to indeterminate liability. The
amendment has substantially reduced that exposure.
This article examines the history of Truth in Lending class
action litigation, the objectives of the civil rule and the statute, the
litigation trends antedating the statute's amendment, the effect of the
amendment, the superiority condition, and the alternative remedies
in Truth in Lending cases. The article concludes that the rule (b)(3)
class action is an unlikely method of obtaining judicial fairness and
economy in most Truth in Lending cases.
II. THE 1966 AMENDMENT OF RULE 23
When rule 23 was amended in 1966, the rulemakers attempted
to substitute a more functional approach for the somewhat abstract
concepts of the original rule. They expected that the flexible proce-
* Adjunct Professor, Ohio State University College of Law.
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dure built into the amended rule would "provide a very real saving
in terms of the burden of litigation." 1 Some of the changes were
challenging and innovative. The new rule was a broad outline of
policies and directions, and it confided a broad range of discretion
to district judges.'
The old rule gave little guidance to the courts in deciding which
of the three types of class actions-true, hybrid or spurious-should
apply to a given case. The amended rule, as it was interpreted by the
Supreme Court's Advisory Committee,3 spelled out the prerequisites
for maintaining any class action.' Then, in separate subdivisions, it
delineated additional requirements intended to assist courts in recog-
nizing the three types of class actions to which they were applicable. 5
Rule 23(b)(3) was intended to encompass those cases "in which
a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense,
and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated,
without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other unde-
sirable results."' Some said its mission was "taking care of the
smaller guy." 7 This rule is based on the assumption that "class action
disposition of multiple similar claims, especially small consumer
claims, is socially desirable."' It is the part of the amended rule into
which the "spurious" class actions were meant to fall,9 and it made
some important changes, not the least of which was that members of
the class were to be bound by the judgment, either for or against
them, unless they took affirmative action to be dropped or excluded
from the class.'"
Rule 23(b)(3) includes a provision that the court must find, inter
alia, "that a class action is superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." This provision
Address of Prof. Charles Alan Wright in Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Judicial
Conference of the Third Judicial Circuit, 42 F.R.D. 437, 567 (Sept. 9, 1966).
2 Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23,43 F.R.D. 39 (1967).
Advisory Committee's Notes to Proposed Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 98 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Comm. Note].
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), (2) and (3).
Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. at 102-03.
7 Report of conversation with Prof. Benjamin Kaplan contained in Frankel, Amended
Rule 23 From A Judge's Point of View, 32 ANTITRUST L.J. 295, 299 (1966).
Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 759 (3d Cir. 1973).
Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 43
(1967).
H0 Id. at 45.
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is the sine qua non of the subdivision and was intended to "reinforce
the point that the court with the aid of the parties ought to assess the
relative advantages of alternative procedures for handling the total
controversy."" One guideline provided in the rule to assist the court
in determining this question of superiority is "the difficulties likely
to be encountered in the management of a class action."12
The amendment of rule 23 acted as an inducement for the
commencement of some very large class actions, many of which fell
into the rule 23(b)(3) category. Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 3
commenced November 7, 1967, was one of the largest of the early
actions under the amended rule. Two others were Illinois v. Harper
and Row Publishers, Inc., 4 and, of course, Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin," discussed later. Court after court was called upon to
determine the superiority question presented by the rule. While var-
ious approaches were taken, a practical view was that of the Second
Circuit, which stated that the trial judge would have to face this
problem in a realistic way. The court ruled that the trial judge should
be afforded the greatest latitude in the exercise of his judgment after
a careful factual exploration as to how this result could be obtained.'6
An early decision of the Tenth Circuit 7 was widely interpreted as
justifying and encouraging a liberal attitude toward class action treat-
ment of such cases.
III. THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT
A. Reasons for the Legislation
In this climate the Truth in Lending Act" was passed in 1968.
From the end of World War II through 1967 the amount of credit
outstanding to consumers in the American market had increased
from 5.6 billion dollars to 95.9 billion dollars, a rate of growth more
than four and one-half times as great as that of the economy." Hear-
" Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. at 103.
12 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
'3 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1971).
" 301 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
'5 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D. N.Y. 1966). See also In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 55
F.R.D. 269 (D.D.C. 1972); Zachary v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 52 F.R.D. 532 (S.D. N.Y.
1971).
11 City of New York v. International Pipe and Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295, 300 (2d Cir.
1969).
'1 Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968).
'a 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1974).
" H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1967).
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ings conducted during several years of congressional study and debate
revealed that consumers were remarkably ignorant of the nature of
their credit obligations and of the costs of deferring payment. 0 The
Truth in Lending Act was designed to remedy the problems which
had developed." Its stated purpose is "to assure a meaningful disclo-
sure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare
more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the
uninformed use of credit. '22 The specific aim of the law was to put a
simple price tag on credit so that the consumer might be enabled to
comparison shop in credit transactions by looking at the annual per-
centage rate.23
The principal purpose of the Act is to make certain that a buyer
in a consumer credit transaction can have accurate information of his
cost for the credit extended to him. Such a transaction is defined as
''one in which the party to whom credit is offered or extended is a
natural person, and the money, property, or services which are the
subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, house-
hold or agricultural purposes. "24
In computing the cost of credit, the term "finance charge" is
defined as the sum of all charges payable by the borrower and im-
posed by the creditor as an incident to the extension of credit. 2 The
finance charge is the basis for determining the annual percentage
rate,'2 which is computed by an actuarial method or a comparable
alternative method approved by the Federal Reserve BoardY The
results of those computations and other relevant aspects of the con-
sumer credit transaction must be disclosed.28
Much of the litigation arising under the Truth in Lending Act
has resulted from the application of § 130,21 which, as originally
enacted, permitted the borrower to recover from the creditor for
failure to make such disclosure an amount equal to twice the amount
of the finance charge, but not less than $100 nor more than $1,000,31
10 Id. at 13; S. REP. No. 392, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1967).
21 Mourning v. Family Publications Service, 411 U.S. 356, 364 (1973).
15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1974).
3 H.R. Rep. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
24 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (1969).
25 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1969).
28 15 U.S.C. § 1606 (1969).
27 Regulation Z, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 12 C.F.R. § 226.5(c)
(1975), prescribed pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1968).
15 U.S.C. § 1631 (1974) and Regulation Z, supra note 27.
15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1974).
3 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1) (1974).
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plus the costs of the action and a reasonable attorney's fee as deter-
mined by the court.3 1
B. Class Action Litigation
The enactment of the Truth in Lending Act encouraged a great
deal of litigation. By November 1973, more than 139 Truth in Lend-
ing cases were reported.32 Many of these cases resulted from the
operation of bank credit card systems, which had achieved significant
market impact since BankAmericard was introduced in 1959 fol-
lowed by Master Charge in 1967. Class action status was sought in
most cases.
The Ninth Circuit stated in December, 1973, that the "clear
trend of authority" was that class actions were inappropriate in Truth
in Lending actions,3 3 but virtually every court that denied class
action status in a Truth in Lending case took pains to point out that
nothing in the congressional history or language of the Act justified
a conclusion that class actions under the Act were prohibited.34 The
Tenth Circuit determined that there was nothing in the Truth in
Lending Act itself, in rule 23, or in the notes of the Advisory Commit-
tee that expressly precluded class actions in this type of case.35 The
court surveyed the legislative history of the Act and found that it
threw scant light on the problem.36 It concluded that to "find any
congressional intent to preclude at all events treatment of such cases
under Rule 23 would be a work of clairvoyance and not of construc-
tion or interpretation. 3 17
C. Applicability of Subdivision (b)(3)
As the flood of Truth in Lending class actions increased, a con-
sensus developed among the courts that subdivision (b)(3) was the
only part of rule 23 that was appropriate to the maintenance of such
actions.3 This subdivision was intended to prevent multiple relitiga-
3' 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2) (1974).
1 See Appendix, Reported Truth in Lending Cases, 29 Bus. LAW. 201 (1973).
3 La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 467-68 n.17 (9th Cir. 1973).
See also Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 763 n.9 (3d Cir. 1974).
11 E.g., Kristiansen v. John Mullins & Sons, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 99 (E.D. N.Y. 1973). See
also Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d 1161, 1165 (7th Cir. 1974).
3 Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 474 F.2d 336, 343 (10th Cir. 1973).
38 Id.
Id. at 344.
1 See, e.g., Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 587, 590 (N.D. I11. 1972); Rodriguez
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tion of the factual and legal issues as to a defendant's liability."9
Professor Benjamin Kaplan has written that "[t]he object is to get at
the cases where a class action promises important advantages of
economy of effort and uniformity of result without undue dilution of
procedural safeguards for members of the class or for the opposing
party."40
Such a characterization of subdivision (b)(3) made it appear
attractive as the vehicle for Truth in Lending class actions, and class
action status was certified in several such cases." Concurrently, how-
ever, warnings were raised in respect of the binding effect of judg-
ments in such actions on nonparticipating members of the class.
Judge Marvin E. Frankel wrote of rule 23(b)(3): "The central change
for this formerly 'spurious' sort of action is that it is no longer
simply a form of 'permissive joinder' device. The amended rule goes
far in the direction of making the result of the common questions
binding for all members of the class."42 To the same effect was the
observation of Chief Judge Anthony T. Augelli: "Because absent
class members will be bound by this Court's decision unless they
take affirmative steps to be excluded from the class, the Court must
carefully decide whether the requirements set forth in Rule 23(a)
and (b)(3) are met."43
IV. RATNER V. CHEMICAL BANK NEW YORK TRUST COMPANY
Until the decision of Judge Frankel in February, 1972, in Ratner
v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co.,44 some trial courts were
v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 189, 192 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Alsup v. Montgo-
mery Ward & Co., 57 F.R.D. 89, 91 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
5' Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 759 (3d Cir. 1973).
40 Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee, 1966 Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 HARV. L. REv. 356, 390 (1967).
41 E.g., La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 55 F.R.D. 22 (D. Ore. 1972), affd 489
F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1973); Douglas v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 334 F. Supp. 1166 (D. Ala. 1971),
rev'd on other grounds, 469 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1972); Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc.,
336 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Mo. 1971); Zachary v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 52 F.R.D. 532 (S.D.
N.Y. 1971); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 52 F.R.D. 510, 53 F.R.D. 539 (W.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd
on rehearing en banc, 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1974); Berkman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 4
CCH Consumer Cred. Guide 99,270 (N.D. Il. 1971).
12 Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 43
(1967).
13 Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 51, (D.N.J. 1971). Obviously, there
are limitations in any case upon the extent to which absent parties will be concluded. See
Frankel, supra note 22, at 46-53.
4 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D. N.Y. 1972).
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guided by the concept that rule 23 should provide a remedy for any-
one whose claim was too small to justify individual litigation and who
would otherwise not be involved in judicial proceedings." The Ratner
decision was a definite rejection of that interpretion.
Ratner sued the bank for himself and as representative of others
similarly situated who held Master Charge credit cards by which
open end accounts were created. 6 He alleged that for the monthly
period ended September 16, 1969, the periodic statement sent to him
by the bank disclosed that his indebtedness prior to that monthly
period had been paid and had given rise to no finance charge; that
during that monthly period he had incurred new indebtedness of
$191.58 for purchases then made; that no finance charges thereon
would be incurred if paid in full in twenty-five days from bill date;
and that a minimum payment of $10.00 within twenty-five days would
be sufficient to avoid delinquency. The statement did not disclose any
annual percentage rate, as required by the Truth in Lending Act and
the implementing regulation.4 7 Ratner paid $10.00 and, on his next
statement, was billed for a finance charge. His ultimate contention,
in the language of his complaint, was that "[d]efendant's monthly
statement to plaintiff in September, 1969, violated the Act and the
implementing Regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 226.7, in that it failed to dis-
close the annual percentage rate or the nominal annual percentage
rate."4 By agreement, the case was first submitted to the court on
Ratner's motion for summary judgment and defendant's motion to
dismiss. In granting the motion for summary judgment, the court
withheld final judgment pending disposition of the class action ques-
tion,49 which had been held in abeyance.
Eight months later, Judge Frankel handed down his seminal
decision 0 that the suit should not be maintained as a class action.5 1
This ruling has been described as the "most commonly cited and
influential decision in which the maintenance of a class action has
been denied."52 It has been cited in more than sixty reported decisions
11 Simon, Class Actions- Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 376 and
citations in n.8 (1972).
15 U.S.C. § 1602(i) (1970).
" Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 274 (S.D. N.Y. 197 1).
" Id.
' Id. at 282.
See Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1974).
54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D. N.Y. 1972).
52 Steele, The Availability and Utilization of the Class Action Remedy Under the "Truth-
in-Lending" Law, 66 F.R.D. 323, 336 (1974).
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to date, most of which chant the same litany "that a class action
should not lie because. . .an award of the statutory penalty of $100
for each class member would defeat the purpose of the Truth in
Lending Act . . .[and] threaten the solvency of the . . .[defendant]
because the statutory penalty would greatly exceed potential actual
damages."53
Judge Frankel, a student of amended rule 23,51 recognized that
"its broad and open-ended terms call for the exercise of some consid-
erable discretion of a pragmatic nature."5 To that end, he summa-
rized the points upon which he based his conclusion, including the
following:
(1) Plaintiff probably suffered no damages but, at most, he
may have been damaged in some amount less than $2.00;
(2) As many as 130,000 Master Charge credit card holders
could have asserted the claim upon which plaintiff brought the suit.
At the minimum rate of $100 apiece, this class would be entitled to a
recovery in the range of $13,000,000;
(3) No other member of the class had evinced an interest in the
lawsuit or brought a similar suit elsewhere;
(4) The one-year limitation period in the Truth in Lending Act
had long since expired;56
(5) If plaintiff prevailed, he would recover $100 plus attorneys'
fees of approximately $20,000 (as agreed between the parties). 7
On those premises, Judge Frankel held it was "not fairly possible
in the circumstances of this case to find the (b)(3) form of class action
'superior to' this specifically 'available' [method] for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy."5 Accordingly, he accepted
the bank's contention that:
• ..the proposed recovery of $100 each for some 130,000 class
members would be a horrendous, possibly annihilating punishment,
unrelated to any damage to the purported class or to any benefit to
"3 Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 770, (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (3d Cir.
1974).
51 E.g., Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39
(1967).
"1 Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D. N.Y. 1972).
56 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1974); American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538
(1974); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 460-61 (E.D.
Pa. 1968).
11 Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 413-14 (S.D. N.Y.
1972).
11 Id. at 416.
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defendant, for what is at most a technical and debatable violation
of the Truth in Lending Act.59
Most of the cases that have followed Ratner cite the "horren-
dous, possibly annihilating punishment" statement as being a
primary reason why the class action is not the superior method for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Two years after
Ratner was decided, the Third Circuit noted that of fifty-one district
courts considering motions for class actions in Truth in Lending
cases, forty had denied such motions while only eleven had permitted
a class action to proceed." Most of the forty decisions cited and relied
on Ratner.61 Some of the eleven decisions cited Ratner but distin-
guished it or declined to follow it.12
V. AMENDMENT OF THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT
The decision in Ratner and the filing of class action suits involv-
ing potential damages of as much as eight billion dollars63 gave
considerable impetus to legislative activity to establish a maximum
liability or otherwise restrict the scope of potential liability in class
actions in Truth in Lending cases.64 A provision to accomplish that
I' d.
Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 763 n.9 (3d Cir. 1974).
*t E.g,, Berkman v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 59 F.R.D. 602 (N.D. III. 1973); Lincig v. City Nat'l
Bank, 59 F.R.D. 154 (S.D. Ohio 1973); Graybeal v. American Savings & Loan Ass'n, 59
F.R.D. 7 (D. D.C. 1973); Alpert v. U.S. Industries, Inc. (C.D. Cal. 1973); Rogers v. Coburn
Fin. Co., 54 F.R.D. 417 (N.D. Ga. 1972), modifying 53 F.R.D. 182 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Shields
v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 442 (D. Ariz. 1972); Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 55 F.R.D. 134
(D. Kan. 1972), affd 474 F.2d 336 (10th Cir. 1973); Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc., 56
F.R.D. 104 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Boggs v. Alto Trailer Sales, Inc., Civ. No. 72-1271 (E.D. La.,
Aug. 7, 1972), vacated and remanded 511 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1975); Haynes v. Logan Furniture
Mart, Inc., Civ. No. 70-C-1827 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 20, 1972), rev'd 503 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1974);
Kenney v. Landis Financial Group, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Iowa 1972); Rodriguez v.
Family Publications Service, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 189 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Alsup v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 57 F.R.D. 89 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
62 Kristiansen v. John Mullins & Sons, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 99 (E.D. N.Y. 1973); La Mar v.
H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 55 F.R.D. 22 (D. Ore. 1972), affd 489 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1973);
Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 545 (N.D. II1. 1972).
63 See, e.g., Gerlach v. Allstate Ins. Co. 338 F. Supp. 642 (S.D. Fla. 1972) ($1 billion
potential liability); Alsup v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 57 F.R.D. 89 (N.D. Cal. 1972) ($8
billion potential liability in companion Mullen case); Kroll v. Cities Service Oil Co., 352 F.
Supp. 357 (N.D. III. 1972) ($68 million alleged liability); Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 55 F.R.D.
134 (D. Kan. 1972), affd 474 F.2d 336 (10th Cir. 1973) (S18 million alleged liability); Katz v.
Carte Blanche Corp., 52 F.R.D. 510, 53 F.R.D. 539 (W.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd on rehearing en
bane, 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1973) ($60 million potential liability).
" See, e.g., Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON TRUTH IN LENDING FOR THE YEAR 1972, 13-14 (1973); 118 CONG. REC. 6913
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result was added to a bill before the Senate in 1972.65 It was approved
by the Senate but died in the House of Representatives with the close
of the Ninety-Second Congress. A bill proposing a similar amend-
ment was introduced in the First Session of the Ninety-Third Con-
gress.6 Finally, such an amendment was passed on October 28,
1974.7 The "horrendous, possibly annihilating punishment" aspect of
Ratner was removed by the amendment of the Truth in Lending
law,68 and the question of the superiority of class action procedure in
Truth in Lending cases must now be determined without regard to
that factor.
The amendment of the Truth in Lending law changed the
amount recoverable 9 to the sum of:
(1) any actual damage sustained as a result of the failure to
comply with the Act;
(2) (A) in the case of an individual action twice the amount
of any finance charge in connection with the transaction, except that
the liability under this subparagraph may not be less than $100 nor
greater than $1,000; or
(B) in the case of a class action, such amount as the court may
allow, except that as to each member of the class no minimum recov-
ery shall be applicable, and the total recovery in such action may not
be more than the lesser of $100,000 or one per centum of the net worth
of the creditor,7" and
(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing
liability, the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's
fee as determined by the court.
The amendment further provides that in determining the amount
of the award in any class action, the court shall consider, among other
relevant factors, the amount of any actual damages awarded, the
frequency and persistence of failures of compliance by the creditor,
(daily ed. Apr. 27, 1972) (letter from J. L. Robertson, Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board, to Senator William Proxmire).
S. 653, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., § 208 (1972).
S . 914, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 208 (1972).
67 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1974).
Boggs v. Alto Trailer Sales, Inc., 511 F.2d 114, 118 (5th Cir. 1975).
9 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1974); see text at supra note 30.
70 The House and Senate Conference Committee Report (No. 93-1429) states:
The limitation on class action suits was further limited to the lesser of $100,000 or I
percent of the net worth of the creditor to protect small business firms from cata-
strophic judgments.
1974 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws, 6153.
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the resources of the creditor, the number of persons adversely af-
fected, and the extent to which the creditor's failure of compliance
was intentional.71
VI. THE SUPERIORITY REQUIREMENT
A. Fundamental Considerations
When a court determines whether to certify a class action, its
task is to inquire whether the requirements of rule 23 have been met,
not whether the plaintiff will probably prevail. on the merits.72 The
procedure followed in some cases of a preliminary hearing (or "mini"
hearing) to inquire into the merits of a suit to ascertain which party
is most likely to prevaiF3 was repudiated by the Supreme Court in
Eisen IV,74 and presumably has been laid to rest.
The Third Circuit has suggested that in order to make a superi-
ority finding the court must undertake (1) an informed consideration
of alternative available methods of adjudication of each issue, (2) a
comparison as to all whose interests may be involved between such
alternative methods and a class action, and (3) a comparison of the
efficiency of adjudication by each method. 75 The question of the man-
ageability of the suit as a class action has been discussed in most
reported cases in the massive class action area, and has been one of
the difficult hurdles for the courts to overcome in resolving the
superiority problem." Professor Wright has written that if courts are
encouraged "to allow maintenance of class actions in controversies
that are unmanageable . . . the rule may come into disrepute even
for the cases to which it is well suited. ' ' 77 That warning was timely
71 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1974) makes that section as amended partially retroactive:
(e) The amendments made by sections 406, 407, and 408 shall apply in deter-
mining the liability of any person under chapter 2 or 4 of the Truth in Lending Act,
unless prior to the date of enactment of the Act such liability has been determined
by final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction and no further review of such
judgment may be had by appeal or otherwise.
72 Weathers v. Peters Realty Corp., 499 F.2d 1197, 1201 (6th Cir. 1974); Miller v. Mackey
Int'l, 452 F.2d 424, 427 (5th Cir. 1971); Hoston v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 67 F.R.D. 650, 653 (E.D.
La. 1975).
" E.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 54 F.R.D. 565 (S.D. N.Y. 1972), rev'd and case
dismissed, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Dolgow
v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664 (E.D. N.Y. 1971), affd 464 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1972).
T' Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
" Katz v. Carte Blance Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 757 (3d Cir. 1974).
7, E.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen 11f), 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973); La Mar v.
H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1973).
77 C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 72 at 307 (1970).
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but has been ignored. Another commentator has suggested that rule
23 has been utilized "to bring into the federal courts literally millions
of claims which otherwise would never have been litigated. 78
B. Elements of the Management Question
Among the separate but interrelated variables involved in a
court's analysis of problems to be encountered in managing a Truth
in Lending class action may be:
(1) The size of the class, which may vary from a few persons
who dealt with a small institution to millions of defrauded customers
of a countrywide chain;
(2) Class members who may be identifiable with ease, or only
after the expenditure of considerable time, effort and money;
(3) Actual damages suffered by individual class members of a
few cents to hundreds of do'llars; or no actual damages, limiting the
recovery to the statutory civil penalties;79
(4) The presence of counterclaims against individual members
of the class, which may result in excluding them from the action, or
separate trials;"0
(5) Miniscule benefits to individual class members, even from
a very large dollar recovery in which the only benefits of consequence
would inure to the attorneys by reason of fees awarded to them.8'
Because a satisfactory answer to the management question may be
determinative of the superiority requirement, all such questions have
a direct bearing on the matter of superiority.
C. Incentives for Litigants and Lawyers
A court undertaking to consider the superiority question will be
aware that the Truth in Lending Act "reflects a transition in congres-
sional policy from a philosophy of let the buyer beware to one of let
the seller disclose."8" It may inquire whether creditors who disregard
their responsibilities under the Act and cause damage to members of
a class should be entitled to have any assurance that their accumu-
11 Pollack, Class Actions Reconsidered: Theory and Practice Under Amended Rule 23,
28 Bus. LAW. 741, 742 (1973).
11 Travers and Landers, The Consumer Class Action, 18 KAN. L. REV. 811, 826 (1970).
o See Albert v. United States Industries, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 491, 499 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
" E.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen I1), 391 F.2d 555, 571 (Lumbard, C.J.,
dissenting) (2d Cir. 1968).
82 Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 377 (1973).
SUPERIORITY REQUIREMENT
lated responsibility cannot be enforced in a class action." It may
take into account whether the "purpose of enacting the statutory
minimum damage provision was as much to induce creditor compli-
ance with the Act as to provide incentives for private litigants." 8
Part of the scheme of the statute is to create a private attorney
general to participate prominently in enforcement. Congress invited
people, whether they were themselves deceived or not, to sue in the
public interest. 85 The emphasis on private enforcement is thus in-
tended to encourage civil actions to insure compliance. 86 In Ratner,
Judge Frankel found that the incentive of class-action benefits was
unnecessary in view of the Act's provision for a $100 minimum recov-
ery and payment of costs and a reasonable fee for counsel.87 The
District Court for the District of Columbia stated that "the incentive
offered by a class action is not necessary to enforce the provisions of
the Act because each individual member of the proposed class has an
adequate remedy by means other than a class action."8 To the con-
trary, the Seventh Circuit declared that "the argument that the incen-
tive for individual litigation precludes class action litigation assumes
that the incentive solely relates to consumer motivation to sue rather
than to creditor compliance with the Act."8 9
The incentive question was before a district court in Alabama
in an action brought under the National Bank Act"° contending that
the defendant bank had charged a rate of interest on credit extended
through the BankAmericard system that was in excess of the rate
allowed by state law, and that this was in violation of the Bank Act.?,
On motions pro and con class action status, Ratner and its progeny
were cited to the court. The court declined to follow the Truth in
Lending cases, because in the action before it the National Bank Act
made no provision for a minimum recovery nor for an award of costs
and attorney's fees. The court declared:
' See Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 474 F.2d 336, 348 (10th Cir. 1973).
4 Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir. 1974).
" Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 280 (S.D. N.Y. 1971).
It may be questioned whether a plaintiff who was not himself deceived, and who
suffered no personal loss, would meet the requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) that his
"claims . . .are typical of the claims . . . of the class"?
m Ives v. W. T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749, 756 (2d Cir. 1975).
" Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D. N.Y. 1972).
" Graybeal v. American Savings & Loan Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7, 16 (D. D.C. 1973).
" Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir. 1974).
- 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1976).
,1 Partain v. First Nat'l Bank, 59 F.R.D. 56 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
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In the absence of such a statutory incentive, the class suit pro-
vides small claimants like plaintiffs in this case the only practicable
method of obtaining judicial consideration of their grievances. The
potential recovery [about $50 per class member] is too small to
justify individual litigation. Thus, if a class action is denied in this
case, one of the principal functions of Rule 23-to provide a means
of vindicating wrongs which, although involving small amounts in-
dividually, affect a large number of people-will be thwarted.92
That analysis appears to support a denial of class action status in
Truth in Lending cases, because the Act now provides for the recov-
ery of actual damages plus statutory civil penalties, costs, and attor-
ney's fees in actions maintained by individuals. 3
The Alabama court was reluctant to deny class action status
and, in expressing its philosophy, stated:
Only in rare instances such as where the expense of maintaining
the action would exceed any recovery which might accrue to the
class members, or where other factors would make a class suit
completely unmanageable, is a court justified in denying class treat-
ment when to do so effectively denies access to the courts. 94
D. Taking Care of the Smaller Guy
The class action concept based on "taking care of the smaller
guy"9 5 has received criticism as well as.praise. Professor Milton Han-
dler points out that "the benefit that accrues to an individual class
member is frequently negligible where his claim is small and the class
is very large."96 Several courts have referred to such actions as devices
for the solicitation of litigation,97 or as encouraging "unnecessary
litigation mainly for the benefit of a few lawyers ready and willing
to promote such cases."98 A district court in Kansas considered it "at
least debatable whether the small claimant has received much benefit
from amended Rule 23."11 In a frequently quoted article viewing the
'1 Id. at 61.
" See text supra at note 69.
9' Partain v. First Nat'l Bank, 59 F.R.D. 56, 61 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
95 See text supra at note 7. See also King v. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc., 519
F.2d 20, 25-26 (7th Cir. 1975).
11 Handler, The Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust
Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1971).
" Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243, 1251 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
,7 Shields v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 46 F.R.D. 448, 451 (D. Ariz. 1971).
W7 ilcox v. Commerce Bank, 55 F.R.D. 134, 137 (D. Kan. 1972), affd474 F.2d 336 (10th
Cir. 1974).
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massive class action from the plaintiff's viewpoint, the term "sheer
nonsense" is the characterization given to the concept of class actions
as tools to obtain redress for persons whose individual losses are too
small to justify litigation in separate actions. 100 The commentator in
that article insists that the "sole reason for permitting class actions
should be to deter law violations by depriving the wrongdoer of the
profits where there is no better way to do so.''I01 A law review note
declares that "most large classes with small individual claims are
particularly apt to be unmanageable if the chief purpose is viewed as
individual compensation."'0 2
Whatever may have been the intention of the rulemakers, it is
apparent that the desirability of providing small claimants a forum
for the recovery of small awards derived from large-scale violations
does not eclipse the problem of manageability. Even when that prob-
lem is solved, it seems likely, as Judge Lumbard stated in Eisen II,
that "the only persons to gain from a class suit are not potential
plaintiffs, but the attorneys who represent them."1 °3
E. Private Enforcement of the Law
Private enforcement provides a necessary supplement to govern-
mental action "both by affording relief to those injured and by serv-
ing as a deterrent to the wrongdoer."' 4 In this area, the Supreme
Court has directed the lower courts to "be alert to provide such
remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional pur-
pose."'05 The utility of a class action to afford relief to those who "are
in a poor position to seek legal redress, either because they do not
know enough or because each redress is disproportionately
expensive,"'' 0 is only one aspect of private enforcement. Of equal or
greater significance is the in terrorem effect of the class action as a
deterrent to wrongdoing. In Dolgow v. Anderson,07 Judge Weinstein
stated "the record of litigated cases is prophylactic-a deterrent to
11 Belcher, Is the Class Action Rule Doing the Job? (Plaintiffs Viewpoint), 55 F.R.D.
365 (1972).
I01 Id. at 368-69.
1o2 Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An Empirical Study, 62 GEo. L.J. 1123, 1167
(1974).
"o Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 571 (2d Cir. 1968).
o'J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
Jo Id.
"I Kalven and Rosenfeld, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHi. L.
Riv. 684, 686 (1941).
"I' Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 487 (E.D. N.Y. 1968).
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future wrongdoing. Every successful suit duly rewarded encourages
other suits to redress misconduct 'and by the same token discourages
misconduct which would occasion suit."'10 8
In Ratner, the plaintiff insisted that class actions were "essential
if private enforcement [were] to render violations of the law
unprofitable." 09 Ratner's counsel argued that
the creditor's standardized conduct affects large numbers of
consumers, and by withholding required information a creditor may
stand to gain many thousands of dollars in additional finance
charges.10 In comparison to this large potential gain from illegality,
the $100 damages and individual action legal fee is evidently trivial
and inadequate to deter a creditor from deliberately flouting the law
or adopting practices of dubious legality.'
While Judge Frankel did not accept that argument as meeting
the rule's requirement of superiority, other courts have found merit
in it."' Moreover, there may be some support for such contentions
in Mr. Chief Justice Burger's comments in Mourning v. Family
Publications Service, Inc.:"1
Congress was clearly aware that merchants could evade the report-
ing requirements of the Act by concealing credit charges. In delegat-
ing rulemaking authority to the [Federal Reserve] Board, Congress
emphasized the Board's authority to prevent such evasion.'
The Chief Justice further noted that the deterrent effect of the Board
rule under challenge in that case clearly implemented the "objectives
of the Act.""'
Such statements make it proper to recognize that the deterrent
effect resulting from private enforcement of the Truth in Lending Act
is a material element of that legislation. Nonetheless, if the deterrent
effect is produced primarily because a class action "utilizes the threat
of unmanageable and expensive litigation to compel settlement,""'
I" See Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards. 69
HARV. L. REV. 658, 663 (1956).
I" Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Class Action 18, Case No. 69-Civ.4195 (S.D.
N.Y. Dec. 6, 1971).
"I This argument seems specious; the Act does not prohibit excessive charges, it merely
requires their disclosure. Most creditors will ignore the disclosure.
,' Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Class Action, supra note 109.
12 E.g., Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d 1161, 1164-1165 (7th Cir. 1974).
11 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
"' Id. at 371.
"' Id. at 373.
III Handler, The Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust
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the class action is certainly not "superior to other available methods
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." ' 7 In any
event, the deterrent effect argument provides no satisfactory answer
to the proposition that little benefit results to the individual members
of the class. When deterrence is the objective, it seems reasonable to
believe that it "could be achieved by fairer, more discriminating and
administratively less onerous means."118
VII. ANALYSIS OF SUPERIORITY ELEMENTS
A. Class Action Damages: the Fluid Class Recovery
Until the 1974 amendment of the Truth in Lending Act there
was no mention of class actions in that law. Now, §1640(a)(2)(B)
provides for a lump sum award to a class of an amount not exceeding
the lesser of $100,000 or one per centum of the net worth of the
creditor, plus costs and a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by
the court.
This damage section appears to deal with part of the problem
involved in the fluid class recovery, which was first utilized in the
Antibiotic cases."9 The enactment affords a method of creating the
fund to be awarded to the class, if a class action is successfully
maintained, based on the concept that the errant defendant should
not be permitted to retain a "pot of gold" created by his illegal
activities. The statute does not, however, provide any method of
distributing that fund to the members of the class for whose alleged
benefit the action was maintained. As a consequence, the difficulty
of distributing the fund to its rightful recipients may cause the class
to the unmanageable.12 1 When Judge Lord sustained the manageabil-
ity of the proposed consumer class in the Antibiotic cases, he held
that individual claims could be made "against the judgment awarded
to the class."121 He reserved for further consideration a determination
of what should be done with the balance of the recovery after paying
Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971), terming
such a device "a form of legalized blackmail."
"7 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
m Handler, supra note 116, at 9.
" In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 287 (S.D. N.Y. 1971).
120 See Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 72 (D. N.J. 1971) stating:
It is readily apparent that no matter how easy it is to establish damages on a class
level, if it is extremely difficult or almost impossible to distribute these sums to their
rightful recipients, the class is unmanageable.
2I In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278, 281 (S.D. N.Y. 1971).
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the individual claims that were presented.
In other cases, courts have ordered distribution of the residual
fund in ways calculated to "assure that the benefits of any recovery
would flow in the main to those who bore the burden of the defen-
dants' allegedly illegal acts." ' Such a procedure has been character-
ized as creating an unwarranted double standard whereby "in litiga-
tion other than class actions, prescribed substantive requirements and
basic procedures continue to govern; but in class actions, primarily
in order to make them 'manageable,' at least some courts have sanc-
tioned a contraction of both defendants' rights and plaintiffs' obliga-
tions."'2
When the Second Circuit decided Eisen 111,124 it repudiated the
principle of fluid class recovery, terming it an unconstitutional viola-
tion of due process because it subjected the defendant to gross dam-
ages involving large numbers of unidentifiable and unasserted claims.
The court declared this procedure "illegal, inadmissible as a solution
of the unmanageability problems of class actions and wholly impro-
per.'"112
The Supreme Court had a chance to write the final chapter of
the fluid class recovery epic, but declined to do so. Mr. Justice Powell
pointed out in a footnote that, because the court found the notice
requirements of rule 23 to be dispositive,
[w]e therefore have no occasion to consider whether the Court of
Appeals correctly resolved the issues of manageability and fluid-
class recovery, or indeed, whether those issues were properly before
the Court of Appeals under the theory of retained jurisdiction. 12
If the Supreme Court had affirmed the Second Circuit's repudia-
tion of fluid class recovery, would Congress have enacted the new
damages provisions, § 1640(a)(2)(B)? Since Congress did enact that
section, will the courts treat the legislation as tacit congressional
approval of the fluid class recovery principle? Whatever may be the
answers to such questions, the fluid class recovery appears to permit
"private attorneys general," created by the amended Truth in Lend-
,1 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 264 (S.D. N.Y. 1971). See also West
Virginia v. Charles Pfizer and Co., Inc., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D. N.Y. 1970), affd 440 F.2d
1079 (2d Cir. 1971); Bebchick v. Public Utilities Commission, 318 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
I" Pollock, Class Actions Reconsidered: Theory and Practice Under Amended Rule 23,
28 Bus. LAW. 741, 746 (1973).
124 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973).
11 Id. at 1018.
"I Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 172 n.10 (1974).
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ing law, to redress wrongs allegedly done to an unidentifiable,
broadly-defined segment of the community rather than to seek bene-
fits for identifiable clients.'2
The amended Truth in Lending Act substitutes the "class as a
whole"' 28 for the individual members of the class as claimants. The
court is authorized to make an allowance to the class, limited to a
sum not more than "the lesser of $100,000 or 1 per centum of the net
worth of the creditor."'' Amazing as it may seem, the size of the
class is not stated as one of the relevant factors to be considered by
the court in determining the amount of the award. 3 The Act
mentions "persons adversely affected," but does not define that term
and they may or may not be members of any class.
It has been contended that if the courts are to carry out the intent
of the drafters of rule 23(b)(3), the cy pres doctrine must be applied
to large class actions which result in the accumulation of a fund which
is not claimed by the putative members of the class. 3 The amend-
ment of the Truth in Lending Act makes that contention even more
significant than before. Thus the prospect that a substantial portion
of the class will not share in the recovery causes the superiority of
the class action to be doubtful.
There is some justification for a view that the award to the class
as a whole was not intended to benefit the individual class members.
The relevant factors to be considered by the court appear to be di-
rected toward punishment of the creditor, rather than as compensa-
tion to injured borrowers. The statue lists as such relevant factors (1)
the amount of any actual damages awarded [to individuals], (2) the
frequency and persistence of failures of compliance by the creditor,
(3) the resources of the creditor, (4) the number of persons "adversely
affected" [but such persons are not necessarily identifiable as mem-
bers of any class], and (5) the extent to which the creditor's failure
of compliance was intentional. 32 Unless individual class members
suffer actual damages which they can prove in the class action litiga-
tion, 3 the only benefit they may derive from such proceedings will
12 Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 386
(1972).
121 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir. 1974).
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (1974).
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (1974).
" Note, Damage Distribution in Class Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy, 39 U. CHI. L.
REV. 448 (1972).
'3 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (1974).
'1 Cf., Plekowski v. Ralston Purina Co., 68 F.R.D. 443, 455 (M.D. Ga. 1975), stating:
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be some portion of the award to the class as a whole, paid upon some
basis of fluid class distribution.
The Fifth Circuit was confronted with this situation in April,
1975 when it considered an action against a trailer sales company
charging violation of the Truth in Lending Act in failing to disclose
specified financing information prior to the consummation of some
one hundred and twenty-one credit transactions. 34 Class action sta-
tus had been denied by the district court, based upon the lack of
superiority of the class action as a method of proceeding under the
facts. That trial court relied on (1) no lack of incentive if class action
procedure were not employed since each claimant was provided with
reasonable attorney's fees and costs under the Act; and (2) the possi-
ble horrendous consequences to the trailer sales company caused by
a damage award of at least $100 to each class member under the old
provisions of the Act. 35
The trial court had rendered judgment for the individual plain-
tiffs for $848 (twice the finance charge) plus attorney's fees of $4,000
and costs. The trial court also had granted injuctive relief for the
benefit of all future credit purchasers. The defendant paid the judg-
ment, but the plaintiffs appealed from the denial of class action sta-
tus. 3
6
In remanding the case for reconsideration of the class action
motion, the Fifth Circuit held that the 1974 amendment of the Truth
in Lending Act had removed the "horrendous result" basis of the
district court's ruling. It directed the district court to reconsider the
motion "in light of facts developed, or to be developed, relating to
• . . (4) the superiority of the class action procedure absent the spec-
ter of a horrendous result being inflicted upon [the defendant] and in
light of the reduction in damages, if any, to the individual members
of the class."1 37 Without intimating any "view as to what the district
court's decision should be on the merits of this class action mo-
tion," 38 Judge Bell observed that, in light of the amendment, the
A recognition that each member of the class would have a right to come into court
and give evidence raises staggering problems of logistics. Manageability could not
be assured, or even predicted. [Citing Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk, A. G., 61 F.R.D.
427, 432-33 (W.D. Mo. 1973)].
' Boggs v. Alto Trailer Sales, Inc., 511 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1975).
' Id. at 117-18.
131 Boggs v. Alto Trailer Sales, Inc., Civil Action No. 71-1271, Memorandum in Opposi-
tion to Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend the Complaint, 2 (E.D. La. Dec. 20, 1975).
'' Boggs v. Alto Trailer Sales, Inc., 511 F.2d 114, 118 (1975).
i Id. at 118.
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recovery by a class member might be "in a lesser amount than would
be the case in an individual action." '' He illustrated his observation
by assuming a hypothetical net worth of the trailer sales company,4 0
which he then divided by the number of class members to arrive at a
pro rata distribution of the fund. Judge Bell then asserted:
In a successful class action without proof of actual damages,
each class member would receive less than $42, dividing one percent
of the assumed net worth among class members. Suing individually,
on the other hand, each class member could recover double the
amount of the finance charge up to $1,000, and, in any event, a
minimum of $100.141
Instead of taking steps for a reconsideration of the motion to
proceed as a class, the plaintiffs asked leave of the district court to
amend their complaint to assert a claim for actual damages. The
district court denied the motion to amend, holding that the issue of
the named plaintiffs' damages had been finally determined without
appeal. 42 Thus at this writing, this case sheds no further light upon
the problem under consideration.
B. Actual Damages: A New Remedy
The amendment of the Truth in Lending Act provides that any
creditor who fails to comply with the requirements of the Act with
respect to any person is liable to such person for "any actual damage
sustained by such person as a result of the failure."14 Thus, if the
borrower is able to prove that he did sustain actual damages, he may
recover such damages in addition to the statutory civil penalties, costs
of the action, and a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the
court.
Prior to this amendment of the law, the Truth in Lending Act
made no provision for the recovery of actual damages. While there
might have been a recovery of "twice the amount of the finance
charge in connection with the transaction,"144 it was not necessary
' Id. at 119.
"Id. at 118.
" The report uses a figure of $500,000, but the arithmetic suggests $5,000.00 was the
intended assumption. See 511 F.2d at 118.
142 Id.
143 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1) (1974).
"I Act of May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, Title 1, 82 Stat. 157, formerly 15 U.S.C. §
1640(a)(I).
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that the finance charge should have been paid or incurred.4 5 The civil
penalty was assessed under the former law (and is assessed under the
present law) for failure of the creditor to disclose the necessary infor-
mation, not for imposing or collecting the finance charge. 4 '
The courts have generally recognized that actual damages in the
Truth in Lending situation are often speculative and particularly dif-
ficult to prove." 7 Nonetheless, in one case under the former law, the
Seventh Circuit believed that actual damages approximated a finance
charge and an interest rate.'48 A commentator has suggested that if
proof of all individual damages was not feasible, actual damages
could be set by a determination of the gross amount of damages
caused by a creditor to a class, utilizing the creditor's business records
and available statistics.'49 That suggestion resembles some proposals
made in some of the fluid recovery type cases, 5 ° but is not acceptable
under the amended Truth in Lending Act, which spells out the man-
ner in which a court must arrive at the amount of an award to the
class as a whole. 5' Actual damages constitute an additional basis of
recovery.
Under the former law, it was held that each individual member
of the proposed class had "an adequate remedy by means other than
a class action," '52 and that the awards provided were "specifically
designed by Congress to encourage each consumer to serve as a
private attorney general in enforcing the Act."' 55 The addition of a
right to recover actual damages constitutes another incentive as well
as a new remedy.
C. Statutory Damages: the Civil Penalties
The statutory provision for the recovery of civil penalties of
"I E.g., Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 474 F.2d 336, 347 (10th Cir. 1973); Shields v. First
Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 442, 446 (D. Ariz. 1972); Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust
Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 279 (S.D. N.Y. 1971). Cf Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 545,
548 (N.D. 11. 1972).
,4 E.g., Hoffman v. Charnita, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 86, 95 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
"7 Beard v. King Appliance Co., 61 F.R.D. 434, 438 (E.D. Va. 1973).
IJ Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d 1161, 1165 (7th Cir. 1974). Cf Alpert
v. U.S. Industries, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 491,497 (C.D. Cal. 1973); Rodriguez v. Family Publications
Service, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 189, 194 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
"I Note, The Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action: An Empirical Study, 62 GEo. L.J. 1123, 1170
(1974). See also Partain v. First Nat'l Bank, 59 F.R.D. 56, 59 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
110 See text supra at notes 103-108.
"I See text supra at note 115.
"s Graybeal v. American Savings & Loan Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7, 16 (D.D.C. 1973).
"5 Alsup v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 57 F.R.D. 89, 93 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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twice the amount of any finance charge, but not less than $100 nor
more than $1,000, is limited to individual actions by the 1974 amend-
ment of the Truth in Lending Act.'54 This limitation adds further
incentive for a consumer to proceed as an individual, especially if he
can prove actual damages in addition to recovering the civil penalties.
Moreover, if the class of which such a person would be a member is
of any considerable size, his money recovery as an individual plaintiff
will likely be greater than what he might receive under the new and
limited class action provision of the amended Truth in Lending Act.1 5
An example of the manner in which awards to individual plain-
tiffs may be made under the amended Truth in Lending statute is
found in Mason v. General Finance Corp.,"' in which a husband and
wife sought to recover statutory civil penalties and their attorney's
fees. The court awarded to each plaintiff twice the finance charge on
each of two transactions,"57 even though the two plaintiffs were co-
signers of two installment notes. In addition, the court found that
each plaintiff was "entitled to recover costs and attorney's fees.""'
The court also rendered judgment for the defendant on its counter-
claim for the unpaid balance due it from the two plaintiffs."' In an
action by a borrower against a mortgage broker involving two sepa-
rate loans arranged by the defendant, the court found violations of
the Truth in Lending Act by the defendant. Explaining its award, the
court stated:
In the two transactions plaintiff received a total of $2,764.92
and has repaid a total of $1,515.19 leaving a balance of $1,249.73,
against which plaintiff is entitled to off-set her statutory damages
of $2,000.00-$1,000.00 (the maximum) in each transac-
tion-leaving a net balance of $750.27 owing to plaintiff.'
The court found that plaintiff's counsel had devoted more than
seventy-eight hours to the maintenance of the action and had ad-
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A) (1974).
'' In case of a miniscule finance charge, as has been common, if the class exceeded 1000
members, the individual recovery would be larger than a pro rata share of the class recovery.
"' 401 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Va. 1975).
7 July transaction finance charge $266.84; December transaction finance charge $339.21;
total award to each plaintiff S1212.10.
",1 401 F. Supp. at 792. See also Walker v. College Toyota, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 778 (W.D.
Va. 1974), affd 519 F.2d 447 (4th Cir. 1975).
15' 401 F. Supp. at 792. Cf. Powers v. Sims and Levin Realtors, 396 F. Supp. 12 (E.D.
Va. 1975); Woods v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 395 F. Supp. 9 (D. Ore. 1975).
10 Pedro v. Pacific Plan of California, 393 F. Supp. 315, 324 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
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vanced $432.48 in litigation expenses on her behalf. An award of
$3,000 was deemed reasonable compensation for such services and
expenses.' This amount of attorney's fees clearly bore a reasonable
relationship to the work performed and was such an award as Con-
gress expected would encourage private enforcement of the Act.
In Pennsylvania an automobile buyer sued for violations of the
Truth in Lending Act in connection with a credit sale. The court
certified the plaintiff as the representative of a class "of all those who
have been, or will be, denied their rights under 15 U.S.C. §1638...
by defendant."'6 2 Because the certification was under rule 23(b)(2),
the court held that it was not required to make a superiority determi-
nation.'63 It further declared that its certification entitled plaintiff
"to seek an injunction which [would] . . . apply to cover the entire
class, but not enable her to press any monetary claims except her
own."'' The court awarded $100 to the plaintiff under 15 U.S.C. §
1640(a)(1) (the original statute prior to the amendment) and stated
that a further hearing would be scheduled to determine a reasonable
attorney's fee.6 5 Summary judgment was rendered for the plaintiff.
Subsequently, upon a motion for reconsideration, the court reiterated
its certification of the plaintiff as representative of the class, granted
plaintiff's motion for a summary judgment, awarded plaintiff $1,000,
and enjoined the defendant from arranging for the extension of credit
to plaintiff or to any member of the class she represented, without
providing the disclosure required by 15 U.S.C. §1638.66
Truth in Lending decisions are now being reported with some
frequency, and cases such as those mentioned above tend to show that
superiority lies more in the area of the individual suit, sometimes
aided by rule 23(b)(2) injunctive relief, than in the rule 23(b)(3) class
action.
D. Injunctive Relief- Another Available Method
Notwithstanding the apparent consensus among the courts that
161 Id,
22 Manning v. Princeton Consumer Discount Co., Inc., 390 F. Supp. 320, 397 F. Supp.
504 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
" 390 F. Supp. at 324.
' Id. at 324-25.
", Id. at 326.
, 397 F. Supp. at 508-09. Although this judgment was rendered seven months after the
amendment of 15 U.S.C. § 1640, the court apparently ignored that amendment, but there is
no disclosure of how the award of $1,000 was determined.
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subdivision (b)(3) is the only part of rule 23 appropriate to the main-
tenance of class actions in Truth in Lending cases when a recovery
of money is sought,167 the Second Circuit has affirmed a class action
injunction under subdivision (b)(2) of the rule."' This action was an
attack on a coupon credit plan which was found to be illegal under
Connecticut usury laws.16 As part of its judgment, the district court
ordered:
That the defendant be and is hereby permanently enjoined from
collecting any further payments under outstanding coupon contracts
in Connecticut, and from entering hereafter into any coupon con-
tracts in Connecticut on which the annual percentage rate exceeds
twelve percent. 70
The defendant contended that ordering a defendant not to collect
money from members of a class was the same as ordering a defendant
to pay money damages; hence, notice should have been required
under rule 23(c)(2). The court disagreed. It held that the injunction
merely required the defendant "to stop violating the law," which was
"a far cry from an award of class-wide damages. 17'
This decision makes the point that a court may deny class action
status under subdivision (b)(3) if it finds that a class action thereunder
is not superior to relief under some other subdivision of rule 23 for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. This approach
was suggested by way of an amendment to rule 23 in the 1972 Report
and Recommendations of the Special Committee on Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of the American College of Trial
Lawyers. 7 That report recommended that in (b)(3) actions "where
the damages likely to be recovered by individual class members are
minimal and yet some important social function may be served if a
class action is allowed, the court should be required to consider the
alternatives available under subdivision (b)(2).' ' 73
Application of subdivision (b)(2) of rule 23 is limited to actions
"' See text supra at note 38. See also La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d
461, 466-67 (9th Cir. 1973).
I' [yes v. W. T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749, 764-65 (2d Cir. 1975).
" Id. at 762.
170 Id. at 764.
"I Id. at 764-65. The Second Circuit's decision was rendered subsequent to the date the
amendments of 15 U.S.C. § 1640 became effective. See 522 F.2d at 753-54 n.6.
112 See at 2, 29. See also La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Company, 489 F.2d 461, 468
n.19 (1973); Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 474 F.2d 336, 342 n.18 (10th Cir. 1973).
,7 Report and Recommendations, see supra, note 172, at 29.
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in which an injunction or declaratory judgment is appropriate to
prevent the party opposing the class from continuing activities that
violate the rights of the class as a whole. The Advisory Committee's
Note states that "[a]ction or inaction is directed to a class within the
meaning of [subdivision (b)(2)] even if it has taken effect or is threat-
ened only as to one or a few members of the class, provided it is based
on grounds which have general application to the class."' The perti-
nent question is whether the defendant's conduct would affect all
persons similarly situated. If so, his acts apply to the class as a whole.
There are no "opt-out" provisions available in (b)(2) cases, class
members have no right to exclude themselves from the class, 7 ' and
(b)(2) suits cannot be maintained if the relief sought relates predomi-
nately to the recovery of money damages.'
Whether pretrial notice should be given to class members in a
(b)(2) class action is not settled. Certainly the mandatory provision
of subdivision (c)(2) is not applicable. It has been suggested that a
court would be well advised to require notice if (1) property rights
are to be adjudicated, (2) the adequacy of the representation of the
class is questioned. It has also been asserted that the right to know
concept would warrant notice to help maintain the integrity of the
class action device.'77 In any event, there is no authoritative decision
requiring the (c)(2) type of notice to be given in a (b)(2) class action
and, as a consequence, the (b)(2) suit in class actions under the Truth
in Lending Act (when appropriate) appears to be superior to the
(b)(3) action.
Amended § 1640(a)(2)(B) of the Truth in Lending Act now ex-
pressly provides that in a class action no minimum recovery is to be
required. That provision and the limitation on the amount of any
monetary award to the class as a whole'78 lend support to the view
that the court should consider injunctive relief before granting class
action certification under subdivision (b)(3). In this connection, the
rule is well established that if an action can be maintained under
' Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. at 102.
'n Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v. American Air Lines, Inc., 490
F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973).
116 Advisory Comm. Note, 39 F.R.D. at 102 (1966). The issue here is whether the injunc-
tion is incidental to the money damages, or the money damages are incidental to the injunction.
See, e.g., Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 385, 391 (D.C. Tex. 1974).
177 Note, Class Actions Under Rule 23(b)(2): A Type of Class Action Which Does Not
Require Eisen Notice, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 504, 521-22 (1975).
17A See text supra at note 70. Cf Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65, 135 (E.D.
Pa. 1975).
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subdivisions (b)(1) or (b)(2), and also under (b)(3), the court should
order that it proceed under (b)(l) or (b)(2), rather than under (b)(3),
so that the judgment will have res judicata effect as to all class
members.'7
E. The Test Case: Another Available Method
The Third Circuit decision in Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp.'80
poses a question whether a "test case," as so described by that court,
would be a superior alternative to the rule 23(b)(3) class action. Katz
sued on behalf of the credit card holders of Carte Blanche Corpora-
tion alleging failure to make the required disclosures under the Truth
in Lending Act. He sought to recover for each class member the $100
minimum civil penalty provided by former § 1640(a)(1). The district
court certified a rule 23(b)(3) class.' A Third Circuit panel affirmed
the class action certification,' but this decision was vacated and the
issue was reheard en banc. In reversing the district court,'83 the Third
Circuit en banc remanded the case to the district court to go forward
with a trial on the liability phase of the case as an individual test case
on behalf of Katz alone.'84
With scant consideration of the requirement of subdivision (c)(1)
of rule 23,185 the appellate court held that the factors of predominance
and superiority need not be determined at the outset of the lawsuit,
if the defendant had sought a postponement of that determination on
the ground of fairness."' The court envisioned the test case as result-
ing in a final judgment'87 as between the named plaintiff and the
defendant and creating a stare decisis effect as between the defen-
dants and members of the putative class 88 which could be enforced
by offensive collateral estoppel. The court left for future considera-
"' Zachary v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 52 F.R.D. 532, 534 (S.D. N.Y. 1971): Van Ger-
inert v. Boeing Co., 259 F.Supp. 125, 130 (S.D. N.Y. 1966); 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 23.31[3], at 23-526, 23-527 (2d ed. 1975).
"' 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
" Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 53 F.R.D. 539 (W.D. Pa. 1971),supplementing 52 F.R.D.
510 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
1K2 17 FED. RULES SERV. 2d 279 (3d Cir. 1973).
', Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 764 (3d Cir. 1974) (en bane).
" Id. at 760, 761.
"' "(I) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class
action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained.
'"' 496 F.2d at 758.
', Id. at 758.
I" d. at 759, 766-67.
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tion, if found appropriate by the district court, any possible consider-
ation of allowing any other phases of the case to proceed as a class
action, should Katz prevail.189 If Carte Blanche prevailed, the case
would end. 9 ' Of course, the consent of the defendant to this proce-
dure was established, and appears to have been. necessary.'19
Upon remand, the district judge informed counsel that he did not
think that Eisen IV 92 required him to disregard the mandate of the
court of appeals to go forward with the test case. Counsel believed
that the suit had been reduced to an individual action on behalf of
Katz. With the case in that posture, it was settled and dismissed with
prejudice.9 3 One commentator has suggested that the district court's
combination of Eisen and Katz effectively reduced Katz to a denial
of class action status.'94 In any event, the Third Circuit held that the
test case procedure would be superior to 23(b)(3) class action certifi-
cation."'
In Ratner the subject of test case procedure naturally arose
because the liability aspect of that case was first determined favorably
to the plaintiff.' The plaintiff argued that the test case procedure
would "flood the Southern District with thousands of $100 law-
suits."' 97 However, Judge Frankel noted that no member of the class
but Ratner had evinced any interest in the suit or had brought a
similar suit elsewhere.'98 Thus neither the predicted flood of lawsuits
nor the apathy of the class was deemed sufficient to justify class
action certification.
The Katz court believed that Carte Blanche would prefer to be
bound in favor of the entire class if it lost the test case,"9 but in
Ratner the Chemical Bank pressed for and obtained a denial of class
action status. No additional suits were brought and there was no
appeal from the district court's decisions. These circumstances lend
,6' Id. at 760-62.
"9 Id. at 758-59.
'' Id. at 760.
,9 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
992 Letter from John H. Morgan to the author and others, November 22, 1974.
"9 Note, 88 HARV. L. REv. 825, 834 (1975).
19 496 F.2d at 762-63.
"' Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. N.Y. 1971).
'' Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Class Action 12, Case No. 69 Civ. 4195, (S.D.
N.Y. Dec. 6, 1971).
,"I Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 413-14 (S.D. N.Y.
1972).
" See 496 F.2d at 757, 760, 762.
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support to the view that defendants will rarely consent to the test case
procedure.210
It is too soon to venture an opinion whether Eisen IV will fore-
close the test case approach. 201 However, in this context it is suggested
that the Supreme Court's decision in American Pipe & Construction
Co. v. Utah212 requires class certification prior to a determination of
liability on the merits, unless the defendant consents to the test case
procedure.03
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The subjects of judicial economy and fairness to the parties are
of first importance in determining whether a rule 23(b)(3) class action
is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudi-
cation of a controversy under the Truth in Lending Act. Under the
former law, such actions have caused heavy expenditures of judicial
time, effort and expense in numerous cases. 204 There is reason to
believe that similar expenditures will not be so prevalent under the
amended law in view of (1) the provision for recovering actual dam-
ages, (2) the limitation of the civil penalties to individual actions, and
(3) the restrictions upon the total fund that may be recovered for the
"class as a whole" in class actions. Also, there may be some chance
that the courts will view recovery under subdivision (2)(B)215 of the
amended Act in the same light as the Second Circuit saw fluid class
recovery, namely "illegal, inadmissible as a solution to the problems
of class actions and wholly improper. ' 25
The incentives offered by the Truth in Lending Act to litigants
and their lawyers have been increased by the amendments. The bene-
fits to class members who may be involved in a rule 23(b)(3) action
are considerably less than they were. While the specter of the horren-
dous consequences to a defendant has been removed by the amend-
ments, there are substantial factors favorable to individual litigants
still remaining. It is to be borne in mind that the rule requires
20 Note, Class Actions Under the Truth in Lending Act, 83 YALE L.J. 1410, 1423-24
(1974).
2I See supra note 194, at 832-33.
22 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1974).
Cf. Peritz v. Liberty Loan Corp., 523 F.2d 349, 353 (7th Cir. 1975).
See Graybeal v. American Savings & Loan Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7, 16 (D.D.C. 1973).
21 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (1974).
20 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir. 1973).
320 37 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 291 (1976)
superiority, not mere adequacy of the class action.117 Rule 23 does not
say that the class vehicle must be "as good as" or "almost as good
as" some other available method. The word chosen was "superior".2 18
In view of that requirement, the class action must be considered to
be an unlikely method to obtain judicial economy and fairness in
most Truth in Lending cases. The exceptions may be expected to
appear if courts will limit the application of rule 23(b)(3) on a case
by case basis, within sound judicial discretion, to situations offering
sensible results.20 9
207 Linn v. Target Stores, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 469, 472 (D. Minn. 1973).
21 Plekowski v. Ralston Purina Co., 68 F.R.D. 443, 454 (M.D. Ga. 1975).
211 Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 474 F.2d 336, 349 (10th Cir. 1973).
